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Abstract 
 
This paper deals with a DC-segmentation of 
interconnected power systems which represents a 
relatively new and interesting approach that could be a 
potential solution for mitigation of the cascading outages 
effects. The DC-segmentation is defined as the use of DC 
links to split large AC grids into sets of smaller 
asynchronously operated AC segments.  By implementing 
grid segmentation, it should be plausible to improve the 
controllability of power flows, to limit the propagation of 
disturbances, to reduce the risk of cascading outages and 
blackouts and to decrease the complexity of power 
systems. The statistical analysis of time series of 
blackouts size measures demonstrates the power law 
region in distributions of different quantities. This heavy 
tail behavior implies that the blackouts of different scales 
may take place and the extreme events cannot be 
overlooked. In order to take into account the risk of large 
blackouts, a new risk assessment method is developed and 
implemented. This method is based on Monte Carlo 
Simulation and takes into account the cascading outages 
of transmission system due to the overloading and the 
hidden failure of protection systems and the response of 
generators/loads/HVDC controllers to the power 
imbalance or the frequency deviation. The effectiveness 
of the DC-segmentation for reducing the risk of large 
blackouts is assessed using the proposed risk assessment 
method applied to a simplified model of the potential 
future intercontinental power grid of Europe and Russia. 
The distributions and expected values of the blackout size 
quantities (including Load Not Served (LNS), Number of 
Transmission component Outage (NTO) and Energy Not 
Served (ENS)) are evaluated before and after the DC-
segmentation. 
 
 
1- Introduction 
 
The modern power transmission networks are large and 
complex systems that have experienced wide blackouts in 
the recent two decades (i.e. the Northeast and Italy 
blackouts in 2003 and India 2012). These rare but 
significant events increase concerns for the stable and 
secure operation of power systems. The main challenges 
for secure operation of power systems are: complex 
modes of instability (angle, voltage and frequency), 
propagation of disturbances across AC grids and 
vulnerability to sabotage strategies. In order to keep a 
complex power system stable and secure, operators need 
to closely coordinate many processes. However, the 
electricity market and its deregulation are pushing the 
electric power industry from cooperation and coordination 
to competition and confidentiality [1]. In this respect, 
system operators confront with a challenging problem for 
appropriate and coordinated provision of security control 
actions regarding the balance between the economy and 
security. The new rules and procedures have led to 
increased complications in power systems operation and 
control [2].  
 
An additional aspect that increases the complexity of the 
problem is the operation of single power systems within 
an interconnected continental-scale grid (e.g. 
interconnected networks in continental Europe – 
ENTSOE and North America – NERC). The areas of an 
interconnected power system generally profit from (i) 
increased security and (ii) mutual economically efficient 
generation. However, it is shown in [3] that the security of 
the resulting interconnected power system could decrease 
with the increase of the interconnection’s size and 
consequently the complexity of the system. 
 
In this situation, the traditional approaches for increasing 
the transmission network capacity do not inherently 
enhance the security of the power system because security 
of a system is also determined by the rules that govern its 
operation [4]. An effective approach should develop a 
defense plan against extreme contingencies and must 
achieve immunity against the large scale blackouts. Also, 
it should act in complex situations and improve the 
controllability to survive inevitable disturbances with 
minimum interruption of customer service.  
 
In order to achieve those goals, increasingly popular and 
capable power electronic devices could be used. In this 
respect, HVDC and FACTS technologies can deal with 
growing uncertainties and increasing complexities of 
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power systems. From the reliability and economic point 
of view, these components can play a significant role in 
the power systems [5].  
 
One of the most important characteristics of HVDC is that 
DC links can dynamically insulate a part of the grid from 
the rest of the system resulting in improved grid 
performance. In contingency conditions, unlike AC lines, 
DC links would not be overloaded due to the 
controllability of power flows which significantly reduces 
the risk of cascading outages [6]. Tanks to this, they can 
separate parts of interconnected systems to avoid the 
widening of large disturbances through the system [5]. In 
general, the DC links provide reliable support and 
performance enhancement for the surrounding AC grid 
[7]. Based on the current operational experience, the 
effective performance of the existing DC links as a 
firewall against the cascading outages during major 
disturbances is reported. For instances, the DC links 
between Quebec and the disturbed area in the Northeast 
2003 blackout [8] and also between the southern part and 
the rest of grid of India in 2012 [9], stopped the 
propagation of the cascading outages at the asynchronous 
interfaces. According to the experiences obtained from 
the large blackouts, DC links could play an important role 
in the future system development [10].  
 
In order to effectively exploit and maximize all the 
benefits of the HVDC technology, an interesting idea of 
power system DC-segmentation has been proposed in 
literatures [2] and [11]-[13]. The DC-segmentation is 
defined as the use of DC links to segment large AC grids 
into sets of asynchronously operated AC segments [11]. 
Figure 1, shows the concept of the DC-segmentation of 
the large AC system into several smaller AC segments 
interconnected solely by means of DC links. 
 
As shown in Fig. 1, the DC links can be bi/tri-polar 
conventional and/or VSC-based HVDC (in blue) or Back-
to-Back HVDC (in red) or Multi-Terminal HVDC (in 
yellow). Usually, the DC-segmentation can be 
accomplished by conversion of existing AC lines to DC 
links. Additionally, the converted AC lines would also 
have higher transfer capabilities than before conversion 
[10]. Therefore, there would not be significant additional 
costs for the transmission lines, except the ones associated 
with AC/DC converter stations. Additionally, in order to 
reduce segmentation costs and construction of new 
convertor stations, the existing DC links can be 
considered as a part of a DC-segmentation scheme. An 
approach presented in [14] can be used in order to 
determine the costs of DC-segmentation. Moreover, this 
reference proposes a method for optimal operation of a 
segmented grid through inter-market optimization and 
scheduling process between the segments. 
 
One of the crucial questions regarding the grid 
segmentation is a determination of the optimal cluster 
sizes and borders. These boundaries of DC-segmentation 
could be formed according to several criteria such as: 
location of existing DC links, stability limited paths, 
congested paths that need more transfer capability, the 
system security and reliability indices, and political 
boundaries where it is applicable. The appropriate 
allocation of DC links requires for a multi-aspect 
investigation which takes into account these criteria. In 
practice, system planers and operators have good ideas 
about potential separation boundaries and number of 
islands under both, technical and nontechnical concerns 
[15].  
 
It is worth to mention that the FACTS devices cannot be 
proposed as a substitute to interconnect the segments 
because in this case the two side segments still remains 
synchronous. Moreover, the control of the added FACTS 
devices to the system may increase the complexity of the 
system. However, the FACTS technology could play its 
role inside the new, smaller synchronous interconnections 
of large power system segments [7]. The feasibility of the 
segmentation with energy storage technology, instead of 
DC links, is studied in [16]. Although the segmentation 
using energy storage devices, allocated at the tie line 
 
Fig. 1. DC-Segmentation of power system contains; a) division of the AC system into segments and b) reconnection of the segments through DC 
links. 
a) b) 
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terminal buses, improves dynamic stability performance 
of the system, the interconnected system still remains 
synchronous and sensitive to the large vulnerabilities. 
 
The main advantages of the DC-segmentation for the 
power grid are the increase of controllability and the 
decrease of complexity. This finally results in increase of 
transfer capacity and market efficiency and in decrease of 
stability constraints and risk of cascading outages. The 
alignment of the contract paths and the physical (actual) 
paths of power flow becomes easier since several 
technical limitations (e.g. stability limitations and transfer 
capability) are less constraining and the quantity of 
controllable power is increased. Therefore, the difficulties 
for efficient electricity market management and 
development decrease. 
 
In a segmented system, the conventional benefits of the 
interconnected system such as the generation and reserve 
sharing and emergency responses are improved or they 
can be more precisely scheduled. Using the proper HVDC 
control strategies, the segments can provide as much 
assistance as plausible for each other during disturbances. 
However, the DC link controllers can limit the flow of 
power to the disturbed segment whenever it jeopardizes 
the supporting segments. As a result, cascading outages 
and collapse will be limited to only one segment which 
reduces the risk of widespread blackouts [12]. Owing to 
this peculiarity, literatures introduce the DC-segmentation 
as a solution for softening the blow of disturbances [13]. 
It is also entitled as the grid shock absorber [13] and 
firewall against disturbances [17]. Therefore, the DC-
segmentation provides major improvements in bulk grid 
security and reliability through the elimination of 
widespread cascading blackouts [12]. However, it does 
not solve all of the security concerns and reliability 
problems. Nevertheless, these issues would be more 
localized, less complex and hence easier and more 
effective to be addressed [7]. 
 
Literatures investigate the advantages of DC-
segmentation for enhancement of the voltage 
controllability specifically in case of VSC-HVDC [11] 
and for improvement of the angular stability as in [18] 
and [19]. Reference [19] demonstrates that the angular 
stability is improved more in the segmented system than 
in the system with multi-infeed HVDC without 
segmentation. Additionally, the application of DC links in 
the segmentation inherently reduces the fault current level 
and its negative consequences will be decreased. 
Regarding the frequency control, two control modes are 
proposed in [20] for the participation of DC links which 
are a) fixed active power, and b) active power control 
using the frequency difference. The proposed control in 
[18] adjusts the active power of DC links proportional to 
the frequency deviation of the post-contingency state with 
respect to two lower/upper limits for frequency deviation. 
Furthermore, [21] studies the coordination of the 
protection and VSC-HVDC systems to improve the 
system security in the post-contingency state and [22] 
proposes the coordination of the DC link frequency 
control with existing underfrequency load shedding 
schemes to limit frequency decay during a major 
disturbance. As a result, it is suggested that the DC-
segmentation can limit the cascading failures and collapse 
to only one segment which reduce the risk of large 
blackouts [12].   
 
The literature survey demonstrates the lack of a 
quantitative study of the DC-segmentation advantages for 
reducing the risk of cascading outages and large 
blackouts. This paper focuses on this important aspect 
using a statistical approach to investigate the risk of 
cascading outages and large blackouts. The structure of 
the paper is as follows. In the next section a detailed 
statistical analysis is performed on the time series of the 
blackouts data of ENTSO-E to investigate the 
peculiarities of their distributions. Then, the risk 
assessment method that captures the cascading outages, 
the response of frequency control reserves and the model 
of DC links is presented. In section IV, the proposed risk 
assessment approach is applied to the potential future 
intercontinental network of Europe/Russia before and 
after the DC-segmentation. Finally, Section V discusses 
the main outcomes of this study. 
 
2- Analysis of Blackouts Data 
 
The study of the time series of blackouts size measures 
like Energy Not Served (ENS), Load Not Served (LNS) 
and number of unserved customers has shown a power 
law region in their distributions [23]. In this paper, a 
detailed statistical analysis is performed on the blackouts 
data of the European transmission network for three 
reliability indicators considered by ENTSO-E, which are 
ENS, LNS and Restoration Time (RT). The data are 
available for major fault events between January 2002 and 
June 2012 [24].  
 
Several studies worldwide have shown a power law 
region in the distribution of the blackout size larger than a 
given size. Here, the maximum likelihood approach is 
used to estimate the power law function and the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic is used to test the 
goodness-of-fit [25]. The probability distributions of three 
measures and their maximum likelihood power law fit are 
shown in Fig. 2. The generic statistical measures 
including the number of events (n), mean (ݔҧ), standard 
deviation (σ) and maximum observed occurrences (xmax) 
are given in the left side of Table 1. The right side of 
Table 1 shows the power law fits including the lower 
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band to the power law behavior (xmin), scaling parameter 
(α), the number of occurrences in the power law region 
(ntail) and p value (p). 
 
A similar approach is applied in [26] to the ENTSO-E 
major event data from 2002 to 2008. The obtained 
statistical results in Fig. 2 and Table 1 are consistent with 
the presented results in [26] whereas our results profit the 
longer time series of blackouts data until July 2012. It is 
worth to mention that these statistical properties are 
obtained for a power grid whose topology continuously 
evolves over the time. However, a power system with a 
fixed topology (that is sufficiently large) is also expected 
to have an approximate power law over some range of 
values. 
 
The power law region demonstrates that the dynamics of 
blackouts can be associated to complex systems with Self-
Organized Criticality (SOC) feature [23]. In the system 
with the SOC characteristic, there are different types of 
variables with opposing driving forces that, in certain 
conditions, could drive the system into a critical operation 
state. Furthermore, the power law region in the 
distribution implies that the blackouts of different scales 
may take place and the extreme events cannot be 
overlooked. The system may experience large blackouts 
with certain probabilities and the occurrences of 
small/large blackouts are not independent but correlated 
each other (e.g. [27], [28]). Therefore, a proposed 
blackout risk assessment method should quantify the 
power law region with reference to different quantities of 
blackout size [27]. 
 
3- Risk Assessment Approach 
 
For the risk assessment purpose, this section describes a 
statistical method aimed at numerically evaluating the risk 
of cascading blackouts. In this respect, the Monte Carlo 
Simulation (MCS) is applied to provide contingency 
scenarios including both generation and transmission 
outages (AC lines and DC links). A random variation in 
the loading pattern is considered while the total load is 
kept constant. The reason for this is that the distribution 
of loads changes during the day and between days and 
cascading blackouts could start at different random 
loading patterns. The random loading pattern is modeled 
with a normal distribution whereas the mean is equal to 
the amounts of the loads and 5% of the variance is also 
considered. 
 
For a given scenario, the method considers the following 
elements:  
a) the effects of cascading outages due to overloads and 
hidden failure of protection systems,  
b) the response of the automatic Frequency Control 
Reserve (FCR) of the generating units and the self-
regulation of loads to power imbalance (i.e. frequency 
deviation) in each step of cascading outages, 
c) the response of DC links inverter and rectifier to the 
power imbalance, 
d) the operator intervention as the corrective actions after 
several steps of cascading outages using manual and 
automatic FCRs and load shedding. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Cumulative distribution functions (black circles) and their maximum likelihood power law fit (gray dashed line) for ENTSOE reliability 
quantities from January 2002 to June 2012. 
 
Table 1. Statistics of major events in ENTSOE from January 2002 to June 2012. 
Data Set n ݔҧ σ xmax xmin α ntail p 
ENS 747 559.71 6773.6 180000 300±154 1.81±0.11 94±116 0.495 
LNS 686 584.84 2438.4 31990 478±141 1.89±0.10 115±80 0.372 
RT 807 407.99 2178.2 32126 163±52 1.71±0.06 148±92 0.935 
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The contingency scenarios construct the system states and 
select the initial events. In the simulation procedure, after 
initial events or after each step of cascading outages, there 
may be a power imbalance and, consequently, a frequency 
deviation in the system. A distributed slack bus model is 
employed in such a way that all of the remaining 
dispatched generating units share the power imbalance 
according to their droop frequency-control characteristics 
(ܴ௚) and their residual capacity where ௚ܲഥ  ( ௚ܲబ) is the 
maximum (initial) power output of generators and ௚ܲಲ is 
the automatic FCR of generators. Also the effect of self-
regulation of loads (ܦௗ) is taken into account [29]. The 
response of DC links inverter and rectifier to the 
frequency deviation are modeled with the generators 
droop (ܴூ௡௩) and the load frequency regulation (ܦோ௘௖), 
respectively. It should be noted that the responses of DC 
links are limited to their upper/lower transfer capability 
limits. Therefore, the frequency deviation (Δf) of the 
system in each step of cascading outages is calculated 
according to the following equation: 
1
D G
i
eq i
eq
P
f
D
RΩ Ω
−Δ
Δ =
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     (1) 
where ΔP is the power imbalance in MW. ܦ௘௤௜  and ܴ௘௤௜ are 
the equivalent frequency characteristics of i-th bus 
obtained by (2) and (5) in MW/Hz and Hz/MW, 
respectively. ΩD (resp. ΩG) indicates the set of demands 
and rectifiers (resp. generators and inverters). For the set 
of generators and inverters connected to i-th bus (ΩG,i) the 
equivalent droop (ܴ௘௤௜ ), the equivalent initial active power 
generation ( ௚ܲబ,௘௤௜ ) and the equivalent maximum active 
power generation ( തܲ௚,௘௤௜ ) are calculated by (2), (3) and (4), 
respectively. 
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where തܲூ௡௩௜  (resp. ூܲ௡௩బ௜ ) is the maximum (resp. initial) 
power of the DC links. Similarly, for the set of loads and 
rectifiers connected to i-th bus (ΩD,i) the equivalent droop 
(ܦ௘௤௜ ሻ and the equivalent demand ሺ ௗܲ,௘௤௜ ሻ are calculated by 
(5) and (6), respectively. 
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where ோܲ௘௖బ
௜  is the initial power of DC links. It is worth 
mentioning that for different loading patterns, a linear 
load flow (DCLF) is used to initially calculate ூܲ௡௩బ
௜  and 
ோܲ௘௖బ
௜ in pre-contingency state. 
 
After the generation and load balance is restored, a DCLF 
is applied to calculate the power flow in each step of the 
cascading outages. For AC lines, the effect of 
transmission system overloads and hidden failure of 
protection systems in cascading outages are considered 
with a flow-dependent probability as given in [3].  
 
In reality, during the emergency state the system operator 
has an opportunity to implement some corrective actions 
and minimize the amount of lost load, after several steps 
of cascading outages. In this simulation, a model of 
operator’s response to contingencies is considered as a 
linearized Optimal Power Flow (DCOPF). The aim of the 
DCOPF is the minimization of the lost load through re-
dispatching the generating units and shedding some loads. 
It is assumed that in this step the operator can utilize both 
automatic and manual FCRs ( ௚ܲഥ ൌ ௚ܲబ ൅ ௚ܲಲ ൅ ௚ܲಾ) where 
௚ܲಾ is the manual FCR of generators. In [29] investigation 
on the cascading dynamics of the power system blackouts 
shows that this model is appropriate to demonstrate the 
power law region in the blackouts size distribution. Note 
that the presented simulation approach studies a power 
system with a fixed topology. Therefore, the continuous 
evolution of the power system state and configuration 
under complex dynamics are, in general, neglected [30]. 
 
After simulating each scenario, the obtained amount of 
lost loads (LNS) and the Number of Transmission 
component Outages (NTO) are used to evaluate the risk 
of blackout. For this purpose, the Complementary 
Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF) of the 
continuous random variables (e.g. the lost load) is 
calculated by simply ranking the data and then scaling the 
ranked data. Also, the Probability Distribution Function 
(PDF) of discrete random variables (e.g. the NTO) is 
calculated simply by assigning a probability to each 
possible value such that the total probability for 
all random variables is equal to 1. The sufficient number 
of the MCS samples is calculated to ensure a specific 
level of accuracy associated with a confidence level [3]. 
The accuracy level is used as the stopping criteria for the 
MCS. It is selected by qualitatively analyzing smoothness 
of distributions particularly in their tail behaviors. At the 
end of the MCS trials, expected values (e.g. Expected 
LNS (ELNS) and Expected ENS (EENS)) are calculated 
using mean operator of the random variable.  
 
In order to quantify the value of risk in terms of cost, the 
ENS should be assessed. For each scenario, the ENS can 
be obtained by multiplying the amount of the lost load 
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and the restoration time. The amount of lost load is 
obtained directly from the simulation results. The number 
of transmission outages has a direct relation to the 
restoration time. So it is assumed as an indicator for the 
restoration time. Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate 
(IEAR) in $/kWh is introduced in [27], that is a factor 
multiplying the ENS to estimate the overall blackout cost. 
This cost is assumed to be fixed in [31] (IEAR = 5.27 
$/kWh) while indeed there is a nonlinear relationship.  
Since this reference has been published in 1987 the IEAR 
value should be calculated in present value. By taking into 
account the inflation over a period of 26 years, adjusted 
present value of IEAR is around 7.5 €/kWh at present 
time.   
 
It should be noted that this risk assessment method is 
based on DC model of the transmission system (DCLF 
and DCOPF) which can cover only some of the most 
important phenomena associated to blackout dynamics. 
Therefore, the risk of cascading failures leading to voltage 
excursions and collapse and transient instability are not 
taken into consideration. As mentioned earlier in section 
2, the DC-segmentation generally improves the voltage 
and angular stability. Besides, this paper only studies the 
risk of cascading outages and system frequency deviation 
where these two stability mechanisms do not impose high 
impact. From now whenever the term segmentation is 
used, it refers to the DC-segmentation. 
 
4- Simulation and Discussion 
 
The effect of the segmentation on the risk of cascading 
outages and blackouts are investigated on a simplified 
model of the potential future intercontinental Europe-
Russian network. Initially, it is assumed that the network 
of Europe and Russia are interconnected with AC lines. 
The schematic of the studied grid is shown in Fig. 3. The 
AC lines and the existing DC links are displayed in black 
and red, respectively. Note that each AC line (resp. node 
with generator) in Fig. 3 may represent several parallel 
lines (resp. generating units connected to a node). The 
total load of the system is 9324.75 p.u. and the total 
installed capacity of generating units is equal to 16419.30 
p.u., where per unit parameters are on a 100 MVA base. 
Furthermore, the amounts of automatic and manual FCRs 
are assumed equal to 7% and 10% of the total capacity of 
generators, respectively. It is assumed that they are evenly 
distributed based on the net generation and consumption 
and the remained capacity of each generator. Note that 
according to the hierarchical FCR (with primary, 
secondary and tertiary), the automatic FCR can be 
considered as the primary and part of the secondary 
whereas the manual FCR is composed of the remained 
part of the secondary and the tertiary.  
 
The unavailability of transmission lines and generation 
units are assumed equal to 0.01. The response of 
generator (rg) and loads (dn) to the frequency deviation are 
considered equal to 0.05 and 1.00, respectively. Note that 
rg and dn are in per-unit and they are converted to Rg and 
Dn for each generator and load by using equation (1). It is 
worth to mention that the studied grid is assumed N-1 
secure (resilient to single outage of generating units and 
transmission lines) that is commonly kept by the system 
operators in the operation of power systems. 
 
Fig. 3. The schematic of the simplified model of the future Europe-Russian network. 
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The proposed segmentation scheme divides the system 
into three segments. This scheme profits the existing 
Nordel segment (network of northern Europe) that is 
connected to the rest of the grid only with DC links. 
These DC links are shown with red solid lines. The 
location of newly added DC links is shown with a red 
dashed line in Fig. 3. These DC links are located at the 
interconnection between the network of Europe and 
Russia which represent a possibility for interconnecting 
the networks only with DC links.  
 
The proposed blackout risk analysis method is applied for 
two cases, a) the system with AC lines as interconnections 
and b) the system with DC links in place (segmented 
system). Then, the risks of blackout before and after 
segmentation are compared using the distribution of the 
LNS, the ENS and the NTOs as the measures of the 
blackout size. For this purpose Fig. 4, 5 and 6 show the 
CCDF of the LNS data, the CCDF of the ENS data and 
the PDF of the NTOs, respectively. The CCDFs and the 
PDF are plotted in the log-log and log-linear axes, 
respectively, to illustrate the power law regions and 
behaviors in the distributions. 
 
As Fig. 4 shows, the PDF of the NTO before 
segmentation has a heavy tail for the large number of 
outages. However, after segmentation not only the 
probability of the large number of outages (larger than 7 
outages) decrease but also the maximum number of 
outages is limited to 22 that is quite lower than the case 
before segmentation (with 32 outages). As a result, the 
segmentation effectively decreases the probability of the 
heavy tail region in the PDF of NTO. 
 
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show the CCDF of LNS and ENS, 
respectively. The CCDFs of the LNS have similar 
behavior before and after segmentation. However, for 
LNS larger than 100 p.u. the case without segmentation 
has events with larger amounts of LNS. The ELNS is 
decreased from 71.42 MW (before segmentation) to 69.64 
MW (after segmentation). 
 
The CCDFs of the ENS in Fig. 6 show that the 
segmentation effectively decreases the size of the largest 
blackouts. The largest blackout size before the 
segmentation is 7075 p.u. (707500 MWh) while it is 
reduced to 920 p.u. (92000 MWh) after the segmentation. 
Moreover, the segmentation has decreased the EENS 
from 90.03 MWh (before segmentation) to 73.90 MWh 
(after segmentation).  
 
Interestingly, the major change in the distribution of 
blackout size occurs in the heavy tail region 
corresponding to the large blackouts. The simulation 
results effectively show a shift in the distribution of this 
region toward lower blackout sizes. As a result, the 
segmentation can be considered as a technically 
appropriate approach to restrain the propagation of the 
cascading outages and consequently the widespread large 
blackouts. 
 
Fig. 4. PDF of number of transmission component outage (NTO) 
before and after segmentation. 
 
 
Fig. 5. CCDF of load not supplied (LNS) before and after 
segmentation. 
 
 
Fig. 6. CCDF of energy not supplied (ENS) before and after 
segmentation. 
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The presented results so far consider that the DC link 
controllers are in the constant power output control mode. 
The effect of DC links responses to the power imbalance 
is investigated through specifying different droop values 
to the DC link controllers in response to the frequency 
deviations, as specified in equations (2)-(6). For this 
purpose three cases are studied, namely (i) without droop 
response, (ii) low droop response and (iii) high droop 
response. The first case considers constant power output 
for DC links as it is mentioned as “after segmentation” in 
the already presented results. In the second case the 
response of the DC links frequency control is selected 
similar with the typical response of generators/loads. The 
third case assumes ten times higher response than the 
second case. Using this control, if frequency in one 
cluster starts to decline (e.g. due to generation loss), 
bordering DC links will adjust their power transfers 
according to their controllers characteristics and the 
frequency difference between the clusters. In this way, it 
is plausible to benefit from the help of neighboring 
clusters in emergency states.  
 
The distribution of NTO, LNS and ENS are depicted for 
three cases in Fig. 7, 8 and 9, respectively. As shown in 
Fig. 7, the probability of large NTO as well as the 
maximum NTO increases with the increase of DC link 
response. Figure 8 does not show a distinct difference 
between CCDF of LNS for different cases. The CCDF of 
ENS in Fig. 9 shows again that the region related to large 
blackouts shifts toward larger blackout sizes with the 
increase of DC link response. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the ELNS and EENS before and after 
segmentation for different cases. The expected values 
increase with the increase of the DC link responses which 
is consistent with the obtained results from the 
distributions. Therefore, in the segmented power system 
the increase of DC links responses to the frequency 
deviation, as it is modeled here, increase probability of 
large blackouts. Moreover, the expected values of the case 
before segmentation effectively decrease after 
segmentation in the cases without response and with low 
response of DC links. However, in the case of after 
segmentation with high response of DC links, the ELNS 
and EENS become higher than in the case before 
segmentation. This can be explained by the fact that the 
local response of DC link controllers to the frequency 
deviation can cause some of the clusters internal AC lines 
to overload and trip. This way, the contingencies can still 
pass from one cluster to the neighboring ones, which is 
not acceptable.  
 
Fig. 7. PDF of NTO for three cases with different DC link responses. 
 
 
Fig. 8. CCDF of LNS for three cases with different DC link responses. 
 
 Fig. 9. CCDF of ENS for three cases with different DC link 
responses.  
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Table 2. The ELNS and EENS for different cases. 
 before segmentation after segmentation  without response low response high response 
ELNS (MW) 71.42 69.64 70.39 72.57 
EENS (MWh) 90.03 73.90 79.30 100.18 
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It should be noted that this model assumes that the DC 
link controllers respond based only on their observed 
frequency deviation in a decentralized and non-
coordinated manner. In order to significantly improve 
effects of the local HVDC control and avoid 
abovementioned problems, one may propose a 
coordinated and centralized approach for obtaining the 
optimal response of DC links in response to severe 
contingencies. It can be expected that in this case, the 
achieved results will be even better than the case without 
the response of DC controllers. 
 
5- Conclusion and Future Investigations 
 
The statistical analysis of the blackouts indicators in the 
network of Europe demonstrates that the probability of 
large blackouts cannot be overlooked. In response to these 
large blackouts, the DC-segmentation has been proposed 
in the literatures to confine the propagation of cascading 
outages to the originating subsystem. A risk assessment 
method is proposed in order to quantitatively study the 
effectiveness of DC-segmentation for reducing the risk of 
large blackouts. The proposed risk assessment approach is 
able to capture the risk of large blackouts. It takes in to 
account the cascading outages of transmission system due 
to the overloading and the hidden failure of protection 
systems and the response of generators/loads/HVDC 
controllers to the frequency deviation. The simulation 
results for the possible future inter-continental grid of 
Europe and Russia, before and after DC-segmentation, 
demonstrate that the risk of cascading outages and large 
blackouts can be decreased effectively. Moreover, the 
consequence of high response of DC links to the power 
imbalance on the increase of the probability of large 
blackouts is demonstrated. A more detailed model of the 
DC link controllers with additional control responsibilities 
(e.g. minimization of the transmission system overloading 
after occurrence of a contingency) can be proposed to 
exploit more advantages from the DC-segmentation. 
 
The possibility for further segmenting the existing 
continental grid of Europe/Russia into smaller segments 
can also be investigated. In this respect, several DC-
segmentation configurations can be proposed for 
replacing a set of AC lines with DC links, and then the 
presented risk assessment approach can be applied to 
evaluate the risk of each configuration. This study 
requires a more detailed model of the network. Besides, in 
the context of evolving power systems under complex 
dynamics, a Highly Optimized Tolerance (HOT) model 
(presented in [32]) can be proposed to design the system 
with the complexity and power laws in uncertain 
environments. It a-priori assumes that there is a 
relationship governing how the resources in the system 
act to limit the event size. In this optimization model the 
DC links can be treated as the resources. The HOT state is 
obtained by minimizing the expected cost of the events 
subject to the constraints of the resources. In this way, 
greater resources are devoted to high probability regions 
of distribution. 
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